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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST AT'E OF UTAH 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF 
WAUSAU, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, ET AL 
Defendant. 
Case 
No.10921 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim filed with the Utah State 
Industrial Commission on behalf of Wendy Sue Russon, 
the two year old surviving child of decedent employees 
of A-1 Quality Glass, Inc., for benefits under the Utah 
\V orkman's Compensation Act. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order on 
March 9, l 967, requiring that Plaintiff pay the prescribed 
1 
statutory benefits under the l-tah \Vorkrnan's Compensa-
tion Act to \Vendy Sue Russon, the minor child of de-
cedent employees. 
Rl£LIEF SOUGH11 ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have this Court affirm the Order 
of the Industrial Commission entered March 9, 1967, 
from which the Plaintiff has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Plaintiff has endeavored to set forth the 
facts in his Brief they appear to reflect somewhat Plain-
tiff's views as to the inferences it would like to draw 
rather than the facts found by the Commission. For this 
reason Defendants submit the following additional facts 
which appear in the record: 
On September 26, 1965, Plaintiff issued its policy of 
"compensation" insurance to A-1 Quality Glass, Inc., 
hereinafter referred to as A-1. Sometime after receiving 
the policy and prior to October 19, 1965, A-1 requested 
Plaintiff to recalculate the premium because it seemed 
too high. (R-30) On or about October 19, 1965, Plaintiff 
sent A-1 an endorsement (R-82) which in the upper right 
hand corner under the printed designation "amount due" 
appeared the figures $161.15 CR. A-l's initial premium 
for the prior year's policy was $145.90 (R-95 ). On De-
cember 3, 1965, Plaintiff claims it mailed A-1 the notice 
of cancellation which appears at R-91. The record does 
not contain any competent evidence that the purported 
notice of cancellation was ever received by A-1. Plain-
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tiff also claims that it sent a copy of the said notice of 
cancellation to the Industrial Commission Compensation 
Division. A copy of the notice does appear in the Com-
mission's file; however, the copy does not bear a date as 
to ·when it was received (R-74). Mrs. Virginia Leahy, 
the policy clerk at the Commission who normally handles 
such notices testified that the notice had not been re-
ceived by the Department by December 17, 1965, which is 
the dak that she left for her vacation (R-76-77). When 
slw returned from her vacation on January 3, 1966 a 
copy of the cancellation notice was in her basket (R-76-
77). Mrs. Leahy further testified that Plaintiff never 
did provide the Commission with a formal cancellation 
card like all the other insuranr.e companies furnish and 
like Plaintiff had furnished in all prior cases while Mrs. 
Leahy had been the policy clerk (R-73, 76). Mrs. Leahy 
further testified that the purported notice did not con-
tain the reason for cancellation as is required by the 
Commission (R-73). 
Two days before the purported cancellation was to 
take effect Plaintiff negotiated A-l's check dated De-
cember 8, 1965, in the amount of $161.15, which it mis-
takenly thought was the amount due (R-87). Sometime in 
.January, 1966, A-1 received Plaintiff's statement (R-88) 
showing the credit of $161.15 as a cash payment and a 
balance due on the policy of $99.75. 
On January 19, 1966, the fatal air crash occurred 
killing Jack E. Horton, the President of A-1, and Bar-
bara Horton, his wife, the secretary of A-1, and both 
parents of the claimant, Wendy Sue Russon. After the 
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fatal cra::;h, A-1 submitted its check in the amount of 
$99.75 (R-89) to Plaintiff and received back a letter from 
Plaintiff (R-90) returning the check and indicating that 
the insurance coverage was cancelled December 15, 1965. 
Thereafter in March, 1966, Plaintiff completed an audit 
of a prior policy which A-1 had had with Plaintiff and 
further determined that the amount of earned premium 
due to Plaintiff for the period 9-26-65 to 12-15-65 was the 
sum of $78.10 (R-97). Plaintiff did not at any time 
return or off er to return any of the balance of the 
unearned premium which remained from A-l's initial 
payment of the $161.15. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE LAW 
IN ATTEMPTING TO EFFECT A CANCELLATION 
OF THE POLICY. 
The law is well established that policy forfeitures 
are abhorred by the Courts. As stated in Couch on 
Insurance 2d, Volume 6, Section 32 :59, pp 277 : 
"It is necessary that the policy manifest a clear 
intention that it may be forfeited for nonpayment 
of premiums. Any ambiguous word, expression, 
or provision relating to forfeiture for nonpayment 
of premiums is to be interpreted against the in-
surer. Every reasonable presumption is against 
such a forfeiture, and a forefiture will not he 
enforced whf'n against equity and good con-
science." 
In that climate we should examine the requirements to 
effect a cancellation. Couch on Insurance 2d, Volume 6. 
at Section 32 :99, pp 322 states: 
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'"The insurer must comply with a 8tatutP n~gulat­
ing thP notice to lw given of forfPiturp for non-
payment of premiums. If the insurer fail8 to com-
ply with the statutes its purported forfeitun• of 
the policy has no effect." 
'rhe Utah Statutes in Section 31-19-14, Utah Codr Anno-
tated, 1953, spell out the notice requirements to be given 
for a cancellation based on a nonpayment of premium. 
The pertinent part of Section 31-19-14 reads as follows: 
''. . . in case of nonpayment of premium by 30 
darys notice by such insurance company ... to the 
Industrial Commission and the employer." (Em-
phasis added) 
Close examination of Plaintiff's purported notice of can-
cellation (R-91) is invalid on is face. It bears a date 
of December 3, 1965, and then purports to cancel the 
insurance policy as of 12 :01 a.m. December 15, 19·65, 
some twelve days later. The notice completely ignores 
the 30-day statutory requirement. As the authorities 
indicate, a notice which does not meet the requirements 
of the statute if a nullity. 
It is further interesting to note that there is no 
evidence in the record as to when the purported notice 
of cancellation was delivered to A-1. There does appear 
at R-112 a mail arrival notice which was not received in 
<>vidence at the hearing but was submitted later by way 
of a Memorandum of Authorities by Plaintiff's counsel. 
It is also apparent that Plaintiff did not comply with 
the statutory requirement that a notice of cancellation 
must be served upon the Industrial Commission. As in-
r11catr<l. by the record the Commission was never furn-
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i~hed with a regular cancellation card that Plaintiff an<l 
other insurers normally use to effect cancellations (H-
73, 76). As further indicated by the record the letter 
notice of December 3, 1965 did not contain the reason 
for cancellation as required by the 1Commission nor had 
it been received by the Commission as late as December 
17, 1965 (R- 76, 77). The clerk did state that when she 
returned from vacation on January 3, 1966, the notice 
was in her filing basket. 
3 ' 
Plaintiff suggests that the letter notice of December 
1965 was timely sent to the Industrial Commission. 
However, no competent evidence was presented by Plain-
tiff nor was a return mail receipt evidencing delivery to 
the Commission as of a certain date submitted. Not even 
with its Memorandum of Authorities did Plaintiff's coun-
sel off er a return receipt showing delivery to the Com-
mission. Indeed even accepting Plaintiff's position for 
the purpose of argument, the thirty-day period after the 
notice was received by the Commission may well have 
run after the January 19th date of the fatal accident. At 
best Plaintiff's cancellation notice was not received by 
the Industrial Commission until after the purported 
effective date of cancellation. 
Plaintiff argues in its Brief that the cancellation 
was not to take effect until 30 days after the 12 :01 a.rn. 
December 15, 1965 deadline. This appears to be a make 
weight argument in an attempt to rehabilitate an ob-
viously defective notice. Plaintiff refers to this 30 day 
period as the statutory period in which A-1 had the 
right to pay the premium to reinstate the policy. It will 
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lw noted that the statute does not refer to any such 
lapse period or any such period wherein a reinstatement 
rnay be effective. ri1he statute clearly and plainly statt>s 
that the only way a policy of industrial compensation 
insurance may be cancelled in case of nonpayment of 
premiums is by "30 days notice" to the Industrial Com-
1ni,ssion and the employer. This mandate of the statute 
was not complied with and Plaintiff should not now be 
permitted to take the position that its cancellation notice 
really didn't mean what it said, i.e. that cancellation 
would take effect at 12 :01 a.m. December 15, 1965, but 
what it really meant was that cancellation was to take 
effect thirty days after December 15, 1965. Plaintiff 
simply did not comply with the statute and the purported 
notice was ineffective to invoke a cancellation. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF RESCINDED ITS PURPORTED NO-
TICE OF CANCELLATION BY RECEIVING AND 
CASHING A-l's CHECK IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$161.15 TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE THE 
PURPORTED CANCELLATION WAS TO TAKE 
EFFECT. 
Certainly Plaintiff should not be allowed to blow 
hot and cold and its intentions should be judged hy its 
conduct. It would appear obvious that Plaintiff intended 
to rescind its purported notice of cancellation when it 
received and negotiated A-l's check (which was mis-
takenlv tendered to cover the entire premium) in the 
amount of $161.15. The exhibit (R-87) clearly shows that 
tlw check dated December 8, 1965 was negotiated and 
paid on December 13, 1965. 
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Plaintiff further indicated that it had rescimlecl its 
notice of cancellation \vhen it sent its stah,rnent (H-SS) 
to A-1 in January, 1966 showing a payment of cash on 
December 10, 1965 in the amount of $161.15 and a bal-
ance due of $99.75. ~Why did Plaintiff accept and nego-
tiate A-l's check without conditions if it did not intend 
to rescind its notice and leave the policy in effect'? Of 
the $161.15 n~ceived, Plaintiff needed only $78.10 to com-
pletely pay for A-l's coverage to December 15, 1965. 
If it did not intend to rescind its cancellation notice why 
didn't Plaintiff immediately offer to return the $83.05 
surplus? 
The statements of Plantiff's manager, Hobert F. 
Larson on cross examination reflect the intention of 
Plaintiff to rescind the cancellation notice. Heading from 
page 64 and 65 of the record: 
"Q. Now as a matter of fad your notice of 
<.'ancellation was dated December 3rd - the one 
you claim that was sent, U)65 - purporting to 
cancel on December 15, 1965, and yet your com-
pany received and endorsed this check No. 6 -
Exhibit No. 6 - on December 13, 1965? 
A. Yes. 
"Q. And so your company took thost> funds. 
$161.15, 
''A. That's true, yes. 
"Q. - and applied them on this policy prP111-
ium paynwnt 1 (Referring to Exhibit No. 3.) 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. \Vas any other notice ever st>n t -- any 
other cancellation notice ever sent - aft('r this 
notice of December 3, 1965? 
8 
''A. No notice of cancellation. X o othPr no-
tice of cancPllation was sent. 
'' Q. So after your company received this 
gxhibit No. () - this elwck for $1Gl.15 - and 
negotiated it, prior to the effective date of the 
cancellation, your company did not send out 
another notice of eancellation I 
"A. No. 
''Q. And in faet after your eompany received 
and endorsed and negotiated this check - Exhibit 
No. 6, in the amount of $161.15 - your company 
thPn submitted a statement, marked Exhibit No. 
7, showing a balance due of $99.75 on this policy 
whirh has been received in evidence as Exhibit 
No. 51 
"A. That's true." 
It is submitted that Plaintiff, hy its conduet, resr!nded 
the purported notice of cancellation. 
POINT III 
BY ITS CONDUCT PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ITS 
RIGHT TO INVOKE A CANCELLATION AND FOR-
FEITURE OF A-I'S POLICY OF INSURANCE. 
Plaintiff argues in its Brief that a part payment of 
premium does not reinstate an insurance policy. Absent 
any elements of waiver or estoppel with respect to such 
payment, Plaintiff would be correct. But in the case 
before the Court we do not have a situation of a payment 
after a policy has expired or been cancelled. This is 
dearly not a case of part payment in an attempt to 
rei11state. This is a case 'vhere an amount less than 
that claimed due was paid by the policyholder and 
accepted hy the Insurer without condition, prior to the 
purported cancellation date. 
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Going once again to Couch on Immranc•(J :2d, \' olum(• 
G, we find the following general rules ,,·ith resrwet to thl:' 
acceptance and retention of overdue payments. Tlw 
applicable part of the pertinent st>ctions read as follows: 
Section 32 :33G, pp 558: 
"In the absence of controlling authority, contratt, 
or charter provision or by-la,,·, th<> g<'nPral rule i~ 
that an insurer which receives, acel:'pts, and rf>-
tains past-due premiums, asSPSSlllPnts, or chwf', 
paid subsequent to the duP date and 1:·xviration 
of the days of grace, if any, renPws tht> contract 
and waives the forfeiture for nonpayment, pro-
vided such acceptance is unconditional and th(' 
facts are known. Any provision of a lif P insur-
ance policy for immediate lapse upon nonpayment 
of interest is waived by the acceptance of a prem-
ium payment; the insurer cannot nt the same 
time accept the premium payment and declare 
the policy lapsed, nor cn11 it lnpse a11to111oticully 
at that time." (Emphasis added) 
Section 32 :338, pp 562 : 
"The acceptance and retention of part of the ovPr-
due premium or assessment likt>wise has the eft'Pet 
of waiving th default of the insured, for the 
insurer has no right to even the part payment 
unless there is in existence a policy or contraet 
of insurance to which the part paynwnt is rPf Pl'-
able. Forfeiture for nonpayment of a premium 
when due is waived hy arcepting and n-•tainin,g 
a partial payment, where tlw insured is led to 
believe that his policy is still in foreP." 
Section 32 :356, pp 577 : 
"The acceptancP of unearned preminms with 
knowledge of existing grounds for forfeiture ('nn-
stitntes a wai·wr of the fnrfritnre. ..\!2."ain. tlw 
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retention by the insurer, with full knowledge of a 
bn~ach by the insured of the conditions of his 
policy, of an unearned premium paid to it and a 
failure to tender a return thereof to the i'nsured 
when pleading a forfeiture in an action on the 
policy, amount to both waiver and estoppel m 
pais." 
And so the Utah Court in the case of Sullivan v. 
Beneficial Life In.rnrcHice Company, 91 U. 405, 64 P.2d 
351, held quoting from the opinion of the Court in that 
case which cites the earlier case of Loftis v. Mutual 
Insurance Company, 38 U. 532, 114 Pac. 134, at page 
360 of 6-t P.2d, the Court states this: 
"\Vhile it is true that the contract of insurance in 
in this case provides that, in case any installment 
of the premium was not paid when due, all rights 
under the policy lapsed or the policy ceased to be 
effective, yet such a provision was for the benefit 
of appellant, and it had the undoubted right to 
treat the policy as in force, although cause for 
forfeiture existed. That insurance companies may 
waive prompt payment of policies, although such 
payment is of the essence of the contract of insur-
ance and may continue and treat policies in force 
after all rights thereunder have lapsed by reason 
of a provision therein that nonpayment of the 
premium or any part thereof shall cause the 
policy to become void and of no force or t>ff Pct, 
is too well settled to admit of dispute." (Emphasis 
added) 
The Court further states at page 361 of 64 P.2d that if an 
attempt to collect a premium after forfeiture constitutes 
a recongition of the contract as being in forre (as held in 
a prior case), certainly actual payment of past due 
premiums and receipt thereof by the insurer without 
ronditions attached, must be given the same effect. 
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Jt is not tlw position of A-l that tlte lMn' S<'lHling ol' 
statPuwnts constitntes a n'cot,rnition of the t'xistence of 
irnmrnrn·p and waiver of pa~·nwnt as Plaintiff citPs under 
his Point ] II quoting from tlw Ellerbeck 1·. C'o11ti11cntal 
Casualty Cm11zwny, G3 U. 530, 227 Pac. 805. 
It is A-l's position that the acceptance of a major 
part of the premium prior to the purported cancellation 
date without condition and then the sending of a state-
ment some two or three weeks later which reflected the 
payment and showed a balance, combine to establish that 
Plaintiff has waived its right to forfeit the policy for 
nonpayment of premium. 
Referring back to tht:~ Ellerbl'ck case it is interesting 
to note that tlw Court held against the insurance com-
pany, ruling that it was a question for the trier of fact 
whether the insurer had extended credit to the policy-
hold<>r for payment of premiums. Of course, in this c·ase 
the tril'r of fact has already reached the conclusion that 
Plaintiff in effect extended credit to A-1 for the payment 
of the balance of the premium. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO CLAIM 
THAT THE INSURANCE POLICY COVERING A-1 
WAS NOT IN FORCE AT THE TIME OF THE LOSS. 
\Vhih• waiver has been defined as the intentional 
relinquislnnent of a known right and is consensual in 
nature, an estoppt>l is not consensual in character hut 
is given effoct to def eat the inequitable intent of the 
party estopped. Scarey t". Erickson,. 2-t-1 :Minn. 232, G9 
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S W:2<l 889, 32 ALR 2d 114-!. As set forth in Point HI, 
D(c•fendants claim the doctrine of waiver with respect to 
Plaintiff. In addition to waiver it is submitted that the 
doetrine of estoppel is also available to A-1 as against 
Plaintiff. 
The facts as outlined and reviewed herein clearly 
indicate that the Plaintiff led A-1 to believe that it was 
eovered by Plaintiff's policy. The credit initially extended 
to A-1 when the policy was first written, the acceptance 
and cashing of A-l's check for $161.15 without conditions 
prior to the purported cancellation date, the sending of 
the statement acknowledging the payment and indicating 
credit for the balance, all could and did reasonably induce 
A-1 to rely and believe it was covered. It should further 
be noted that a proration of the insurance premium 
came to less than $32.00 per month and as indicated 
by Plaintiff's mvn witness and by the subsequent audits 
of the coverage, at the time of the purported cancellation 
only $78.10 of the $161.15 had been earned. The provi-
~ions of the insurance policy in question spell out with 
particularity the responsibility of Plaintiff in the event 
it cancels the insurance. Reading from Paragraph 15 
of the policy at R-86: 
''If the company cancels, earned premiums shall 
be computed prorata. Pr<:>mium Hdjustrnent ma>· 
he made at the tinw cancellation is effrctl'cl and, 
if not then made>, shall lw made as soon as pradiC'-
nhlE~ after eancellation berornes effoetin·." 
Ko refund of unearned premium was ever made. Clearly 
Plaintiff should be estopped to claim a forfeiture of 
the insurance coverage. 
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POINT V 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN MAKING THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AS SET FORTH 
IN ITS ORDER. 
Plaintiff complains that the Commission erred in 
failing to make various additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The pertinent part of Section 35-1-
85, Utah Code Annoated, 1953 reads as follows: 
"After Pach formal hParing, it shall hP tlw dnt:--, of 
the commission to make finding~ of fact and eon-
clusions of law in writing and filP the sanw with 
its secretary. The findings and conclusions of the 
commission on qm'stions of fact shall he conclu-
sive and final and shall not he suhjert to n·view: 
such questions of fact shall includP ultimate fact~ 
and findings and conclusions of the commission." 
A reading of the cases interpreting this section clearly 
indicate that the Industrial Commission is not required 
to make specific findings upon all questions of faet. 
As stated in the case of Denver & R.G. W.R. System v. 
Indu.strial Commission of Utah et al, 66 U. 494, 243 Pac. 
800: ''The Industrial Commission is not required to make 
specific findings.'' However, it is submitted that the 
Commission did make findings with respect to the main 
issues involved and did find and conclude that A-1 
Quality Glass, Inc. was covered at the time of the fatal 
plane crash with Workman's Compensation Insurance 
by Employers Mutual of Wausau. 
It should further be noted that the cases have dc'ter-
mined that the Commission has the prerogative of making 
the determination of facts which will not be distnrlw<l in 
the absence of capricious or arbitrary action. DaU.011 1-. 
14 
Industrial Commission, 8 U.2d 353, 334 P.2d 763. It 
would seem readily apparent that the Commission's de-
termination of the facts in this case is not arbitrary or 
tapnc1ous. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is submitted that there is ample 
substantial evidence in the record to support the Find-
ings, Conclusions and the Order entered by the Industrial 
Commission with respect to insurance coverage by the 
Plaintiff. The Order of the Industrial Commission should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\V. Eugene Hansen 
Nielsen, Conder, Hansen & Henroid 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Deff'ndant A-1 
Quality Glass, Inc. 
Leon M. Frazier 
160 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
Attorney for Applicant, 
Phillip E. Russon 
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